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Abstract
We describe a new complete algorithm for computing Nash equilibrium in multiplayer general-sum
games, based on a quadratically-constrained feasibility program formulation. We demonstrate that the
algorithm runs significantly faster than the prior fastest complete algorithm on several game classes
previously studied and that its runtimes even outperform the best incomplete algorithms.
1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept in game theory. While a Nash equilibrium can be com-
puted in polynomial time for two-player zero-sum games, it is PPAD-hard for two-player general-sum and
multiplayer games and widely believed that no efficient algorithms exist [7, 8, 9]. Furthermore, even if we
were able to compute an equilibrium for these game classes, it would have no performance guarantee. In a
two-player zero-sum game, every Nash equilibrium guarantees at least the value of the game in expectation
in the worst case. Therefore, if players alternate roles, a Nash equilibrium would guarantee a win or tie in
expectation regardless of the strategy used by the opponent. However, for non-zero-sum and multiplayer
games, an equilibrium would have no performance guarantee. There can be multiple equilibria with dif-
ferent values, and if the opponents play strategies from a different equilibrium than ours then the resulting
strategies may not be in equilibrium.
Despite these computational and conceptual challenges, we must still create agents with strong strate-
gies for these settings, and Nash equilibrium is a compelling starting point. It was shown that an exact Nash
equilibrium strategy defeated a variety of agents submitted for a class project in 3-player Kuhn poker [11].
Recently an agent was created for 6-player no-limit Texas hold ’em that defeated strong human players
by attempting to approximate Nash equilibrium strategies [6]. The core equilibrium-finding technique used
by this agent was based on the counterfactual regret minimization algorithm, an iterative self-play proce-
dure [23]. It has been demonstrated that counterfactual regret minimization does in fact converge to an
ǫ-Nash equilibrium (a strategy profile in which no player can gain more than ǫ by deviating) for small ǫ
in three-player Kuhn poker, while it does not converge to equilibrium in the larger game of three-player
Leduc hold ’em [1]. These results show that Nash equilibrium strategies (or their approximations) can be
successful in practice despite the fact that they do not have a performance guarantee.
Several algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in multiplayer games; how-
ever, many of them are incomplete, slow, and/or produce solutions with poor approximation quality (i.e.,
high ǫ). An algorithm is complete if it always finds a solution when one exists (at least one Nash equilibrium
is guaranteed to exist in all finite games [18]). We present a new algorithm that is complete and runs signifi-
cantly faster than prior complete algorithms, and even runs faster than the best incomplete algorithms. Our
algorithm is based on a novel quadratically-constrained mixed-integer program formulation that utilizes a
technique from the newest Gurobi release [14]. We run experiments on uniform random games with a vari-
ety of players and strategy sizes, as well as several games produced from the GAMUT generator [19]. We
compare our algorithm against the best prior algorithms, which include several complete methods as well as
faster incomplete methods available on the GAMBIT software suite [17].
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2 Notation
A strategic-form game consists of a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, a finite set of pure strategies Si for
each player i ∈ N , and a real-valued utility for each player for each strategy vector (aka strategy profile),
ui : ×iSi → R. We will assume that the sets Si are disjoint, and for simplicity assume that all Si have the
same cardinality. For sj ∈ Si define the player function to be P (sj) = i (which is well-defined under the
assumption that the Si are disjoint). Suppose that sjk ∈ Sik for k = 1 . . . n, and suppose that the ik ∈ N
are all distinct. Then for w ∈ N define uˆw(sj1 , . . . , sjn) = uw(sm1 , . . . , smn), where mq equals the jk
such that P (jk) = q (and therefore that smq ∈ Sq). That is, in the event that the sjk are not in order of
increasing value of the player P (sjk), the uˆ function will compute the utility assuming that the vector of
strategies is listed in the order of increasing players so that u can be properly applied. For example, suppose
that s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2, s3 ∈ S3. Then uˆw(s2, s3, s1) = uw(s1, s2, s3), for w ∈ N . This notation will be
useful in order to provide more concise representations of our optimization formulations.
A mixed strategy σi for player i is a probability distribution over pure strategies, where σi(si′) is
the probability that player i plays pure strategy si′ ∈ Si under σi. Let Σi denote the full set of mixed
strategies for player i. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1 , . . . , σ
∗
n) is a Nash equilibrium if ui(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i) ≥
ui(σi, σ
∗
−i) for all σi ∈ Σi for all i ∈ N , where σ
∗
−i denotes the vector of the components of strat-
egy σ∗ for all players excluding player i. For a given candidate strategy profile σ∗, define ǫ = ǫ(σ∗) =
maximaxσi∈Σi
[
ui(σi, σ
∗
−i)− ui(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i)
]
.
3 Algorithm
We first describe a linear mixed-integer feasibility program formulation for computing Nash equilibrium in
two-player general-sum games [21]. That work presented four different formulations each using a different
objective function and set of constraints, and demonstrated that the first one significantly outperformed the
other three. The first formulation was a feasibility program with no objective function, in which the set of
Nash equilibria correspond exactly to feasible solutions. We use this formulation as a starting point for our
new multiplayer formulations.
3.1 Linear mixed-integer feasibility formulation for two-player Nash equilibrium
We quote from the original description of the program formulation for two-player Nash equilibrium, and
present the formulation below:
In our first formulation, the feasible solutions are exactly the equilibria of the game. For every
pure strategy si, there is binary variable bsi . If this variable is set to 1, the probability placed on
the strategy must be 0. If it is set to 0, the strategy is allowed to be in the support, but the regret of
the strategy must be 0. The formulation has the following variables other than the bsi . For each
player, there is a variable ui indicating the highest possible expected utility that that player can
obtain given the other player’s mixed strategy. For every pure strategy si, there is a variable psi
indicating the probability placed on that strategy, a variable usi indicating the expected utility of
playing that strategy (given the other player’s mixed strategy), and a variable rsi indicating the
regret of playing si. The constant Ui indicates the maximum difference between two utilities
in the game for player i: Ui = maxshi ,sli∈Si,sh1−i,sl1−i∈S1−i
[
ui(s
h
i , s
h
1−i)− ui(s
l
i, s
l
1−i)
]
. The
formulation follows below [21].
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Find psi, ui, usi , rsi , bsi such that:∑
si∈Si
psi = 1 for all i (1)
usi =
∑
s1−i∈S1−i
ps1−iui(si, s1−i) for all i, si ∈ Si (2)
ui ≥ usi for all i, si ∈ Si (3)
rsi = ui − usi for all i, si ∈ Si (4)
psi ≤ 1− bsi for all i, si ∈ Si (5)
rsi ≤ Uibsi for all i, si ∈ Si (6)
psi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si (7)
ui ≥ 0 for all i (8)
usi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si (9)
rsi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si (10)
bsi binary in {0, 1} for all i, si ∈ Si (11)
The first four constraints ensure that the psi values constitute a valid probability distribution
and define the regret of a strategy. Constraint 5 ensures that bsi can be set to 1 only when no
probability is placed on si. On the other hand, Constraint 6 ensures that the regret of a strategy
equals 0, unless bsi = 1, in which case the constraint is vacuous because the regret can never
exceed Ui. (Technically, Constraint 3 is redundant as it follows from Constraints 4 and 10.) [21]
For clarity, we will rewrite the system with the redundant Constraint 3 removed, as our extensions will
be based on this formulation.
Find psi, ui, usi , rsi , bsi such that:∑
si∈Si
psi = 1 for all i
usi =
∑
s1−i∈S1−i
ps1−iui(si, s1−i) for all i, si ∈ Si
rsi = ui − usi for all i, si ∈ Si
psi ≤ 1− bsi for all i, si ∈ Si
rsi ≤ Uibsi for all i, si ∈ Si
psi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
ui ≥ 0 for all i
usi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
rsi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
bsi binary in {0, 1} for all i, si ∈ Si
3.2 New formulation for three-player Nash equilibrium
We now describe an extension of the previous two-player formulation to three players. To do this, we in-
troduce new variables, psi,sj , which denote the product of the variables psi and psj . Note that these new
product constraints are now quadratic (while all other constraints remain linear).
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Find psi, ui, usi , rsi , bsi , psi,sj such that:∑
si∈Si
psi = 1 for all i
usi =
∑
sj∈S2
∑
sk∈S3
psj ,sku1(si, sj, sk) for all si ∈ S1
usj =
∑
si∈S1
∑
sk∈S3
psi,sku2(si, sj , sk) for all sj ∈ S2
usk =
∑
si∈S1
∑
sj∈S2
psi,sju3(si, sj, sk) for all sk ∈ S3
psi,sj = psi · psj for all i, j, si ∈ S1, sj ∈ S2
psi,sj = psi · psj for all i, j, si ∈ S1, sj ∈ S3
psi,sj = psi · psj for all i, j, si ∈ S2, sj ∈ S3
rsi = ui − usi for all i, si ∈ Si
psi ≤ 1− bsi for all i, si ∈ Si
rsi ≤ Uibsi for all i, si ∈ Si
psi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
ui ≥ 0 for all i
usi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
rsi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
bsi binary in {0, 1} for all i, si ∈ Si
We can simplify the presentation by condensing the constraints for usi and for the product variables
psi,sj , using the notation for uˆ defined in Section 2.
Find psi, ui, usi , rsi , bsi , psi,sj such that:∑
si∈Si
psi = 1 for all i
usi =
∑
sj∈SJ
∑
sk∈SK
psj ,sk uˆP (si)(si, sj, sk) for all I, J 6= I,K 6= I, J < K, si ∈ SI
psi,sj = psi · psj for all I, J ∈ N, I < J, si ∈ SI , sj ∈ SJ
rsi = ui − usi for all i, si ∈ Si
psi ≤ 1− bsi for all i, si ∈ Si
rsi ≤ Uibsi for all i, si ∈ Si
psi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
ui ≥ 0 for all i
usi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
rsi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
bsi binary in {0, 1} for all i, si ∈ Si
3.3 New formulation for four-player Nash equilibrium
We further extend our 3-player formulation to 4 players by introducing new variables psi,sj ,sk .We still retain
the psi,sj variables as before, and include additional constraints of the form psi,sj ,sk = psi · psj ,sk . Thus,
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despite the expected utilities being cubic in the original variables psi , we are able to obtain a formulation
that only has linear and quadratic constraints.
Find psi, ui, usi , rsi , bsi , psi,sj , psi,sj ,sk such that:
∑
si∈Si
psi = 1 for all i
usi =
∑
sj∈S2,sk∈S3,sm∈S4
psj ,sk,smu1(si, sj, sk, sm) for all si ∈ S1
usj =
∑
si∈S1,sk∈S3,sm∈S4
psi,sk,smu2(si, sj , sk, sm) for all sj ∈ S2
usk =
∑
si∈S1,sj∈S2,sm∈S4
psi,sj ,smu3(si, sj, sk, sm) for all sk ∈ S3
usm =
∑
si∈S1,sj∈S2,sk∈S3
psi,sj ,sku4(si, sj , sk, sm) for all sm ∈ S4
psi,sj = psi · psj for all si ∈ S1, sj ∈ S2
psi,sj = psi · psj for all si ∈ S1, sj ∈ S3
psi,sj = psi · psj for all si ∈ S1, sj ∈ S4
psi,sj = psi · psj for all si ∈ S2, sj ∈ S3
psi,sj = psi · psj for all si ∈ S2, sj ∈ S4
psi,sj = psi · psj for all si ∈ S3, sj ∈ S4
psi,sj ,sk = psi · psj ,sk for all si ∈ S1, sj ∈ S2, sk ∈ S3
psi,sj ,sk = psi · psj ,sk for all si ∈ S1, sj ∈ S2, sk ∈ S4
psi,sj ,sk = psi · psj ,sk for all si ∈ S1, sj ∈ S3, sk ∈ S4
psi,sj ,sk = psi · psj ,sk for all si ∈ S2, sj ∈ S3, sk ∈ S4
rsi = ui − usi for all i, si ∈ Si
psi ≤ 1− bsi for all i, si ∈ Si
rsi ≤ Uibsi for all i, si ∈ Si
psi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
ui ≥ 0 for all i
usi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
rsi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
bsi binary in {0, 1} for all i, si ∈ Si
As for the 3-player version we can simplify the presentation by condensing constraints and utilizing uˆ.
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Find psi, ui, usi , rsi , bsi , psi,sj , psi,sj ,sk such that:∑
si∈Si
psi = 1 for all i
usi =
∑
sj∈SJ
∑
sk∈SK
∑
sm∈SM
psj ,sk,smuˆP (si)(si, sj, sk, sm) for all I, J 6= I,K 6= I,M 6= I, J < K < M, si ∈ SI
psi,sj = psi · psj for all I, J ∈ N, I < J, si ∈ SI , sj ∈ SJ
psi,sj,sk = psi · psj ,sk for all I, J,K ∈ N, I < J < K, si ∈ SI , sj ∈ SJ , sk ∈ SK
rsi = ui − usi for all i, si ∈ Si
psi ≤ 1− bsi for all i, si ∈ Si
rsi ≤ Uibsi for all i, si ∈ Si
psi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
ui ≥ 0 for all i
usi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
rsi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
bsi binary in {0, 1} for all i, si ∈ Si
3.4 Five-player Nash equilibrium
We can create a similar extension for 5 players that again only uses linear and quadratic constraints.
Find psi, ui, usi , rsi , bsi , psi,sj , psi,sj ,sk , psi,sj ,sk,sm such that:∑
si∈Si
psi = 1 for all i
usi =
∑
sj∈SJ
∑
sk∈SK
∑
sm∈SM
∑
so∈SO
psj ,sk,sm,so uˆP (si)(si, sj , sk, sm, so)∀I, {J,K,M,O} 6= I, J < K < M < O, si ∈ SI
psi,sj = psi · psj for all I, J ∈ N, I < J, si ∈ SI , sj ∈ SJ
psi,sj ,sk = psi · psj ,sk for all I, J,K ∈ N, I < J < K, si ∈ SI , sj ∈ SJ , sk ∈ SK
psi,sj ,sk,sm = psi · psj ,sk,sm for all I, J,K,M ∈ N, I < J < K < M, si ∈ SI , sj ∈ SJ , sk ∈ SK , sm ∈ SM
rsi = ui − usi for all i, si ∈ Si
psi ≤ 1− bsi for all i, si ∈ Si
rsi ≤ Uibsi for all i, si ∈ Si
psi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
ui ≥ 0 for all i
usi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
rsi ≥ 0 for all i, si ∈ Si
bsi binary in {0, 1} for all i, si ∈ Si
3.5 New formulation for n-player Nash equilibrium
One can easily see how our formulation can be generalized to one for n players that has only linear and
quadratic constraints. There will bemk
(
n
k
)
of the psi1 ,...,sik terms of length k for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1, where
m = |Si| is the number of per strategies for each player. So the total number of the p terms will be
n−1∑
k=1
mk
(
n
k
)
≤
n−1∑
k=1
mn−1
(
n
k
)
= mn−1
n−1∑
k=1
(
n
k
)
= mn−1(2n − 2) = O((2m)n−1).
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3.6 Computation of Nash equilibrium from new quadratic program formulation
While we have been able to formulate the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium for n ≥ 3 players as
a quadratically-constrained program (QCP), unfortunately the constraint matrix is not positive semidefinite
making the overall program non-convex and more challenging to solve. The best commercial solvers could
previously solve convex QCPs but not non-convex QCPs, and the best approach was to approximate products
of variables by using piecewise linear approximations [4]; however, this approach introduces a large number
of new variables and constraints, leading to large run times, as well as an added layer of approximation error.
Recently Gurobi has released an approach that is able to solve non-convex programs with quadratic objective
and constraints [14]. The solver allows for both continuous and integral variables, and so can handle mixed-
integer quadratically-constrained programs (MIQCPs), which is what we are interested in. The new method
addresses non-convex bilinear constraints using an analogue of the simplex algorithm with McCormick
envelopes for constructing relaxations with new approaches for cutting planes and spatial branching.
4 Experiments
For our first set of experiments, we generated games with payoffs uniformly random in [0,1] for a variety of
number of players n and number of pure strategies m. We used the same parameter values as those used for
previous experiments for complete algorithms [3]. For each set of parameter values (n,m), we generated
1,000 random games as the prior work had done (with the exception of the largest game n = 5,m = 3 for
which we generated 100 games). We set a time limit of 900 seconds for the random game experiments as
the prior work had done.
For all experiments with our algorithm we used Gurobi’s non-convex MIQCP solver, with feasibility
tolerance parameter set to 0.0001. We used an Intel Core i7-8550U at 1.80 GHz with 16 GB of RAM under
64-bit Windows 10 (8 threads). Prior experiments had been done with similar hardware: Intel Core i7-6500U
at 2.50 GHz with 16 GB of RAM under 64-bit Windows 7 [3].
The results from experiments with our MIQCP algorithm on random games are shown in Table 1. For
all games other than the largest class (n = 5,m = 3) the algorithm had very fast runtimes (in most cases
averaging a fraction of a second), with zero runs over the time limit. For the largest class the algorithm hit
the time limit in 58% of instances. Analogous results for the best prior complete algorithms are shown in
Table 2. Other than for the n = 5,m = 3 games, our algorithm outperformed both other algorithms by
orders of magnitude in runtime.
n m Avg. time(s) Median time(s) OverTime%
3 2 0.00707 0.0 0
3 3 0.02342 0.02901 0
3 5 0.85763 0.26544 0
4 2 0.02598 0.03124 0
4 3 1.35334 0.40505 0
5 2 0.11873 0.09373 0
5 3 607.68524 900.0 58
Table 1: Results of new MIQCP algorithm for random games.
The Exclusion Method is a complete tree-search-based method that has the best upper bound with respect
to the number of players n [3]. The algorithm divides the search space into smaller regions and examines
whether an equilibrium can exist in the region. The k-Uniform Search algorithm is based on an improvement
to a prior exhaustive complete method [2] where a search is performed over the space of k-uniform strate-
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Exclusion Method k-Uniform Search
n m Avg. time(s) Median time(s) OverTime% k Avg. time(s) OverTime%
3 2 0.04 0.02 0 2/180 49 1
3 3 26 1.2 1 3/18 191 29
3 5 900 900 100 5 94 33
4 2 99 0.48 8 2/40 23 15
4 3 352 87 30 3/8 85 33
5 2 125 2.7 10 2/8 1.0 30
5 3 520 589 46 3 7.9 36
Table 2: Results of prior complete algorithms for random games [3].
gies for incrementally increasing k. (A k-uniform strategy is a strategy where all probabilities are integer
multiples of 1
k
.) This approach was used as a benchmark in prior work [3]. Note that these algorithms do not
involve the use of a commercial solver such as Gurobi.
We next experimented on several games produced from the GAMUT generator [19]. We used the same
games and parameter settings as used in prior work [3]. In particular, we used the variants with 3 players
and 3 actions per player. For the congestion game class we used 2 for the number of facilities parameter,
and for the covariant game we used r = −0.5. All other parameters were generated randomly (as the prior
experiments had done). We generated 1,000 games from each class using these distributions. We did not use
any time limit for these experiments.
Results for our new MIQCP algorithm over the GAMUT games are shown in Table 3. We normalized
all payoffs to be in [0,1] (by subtracting the smallest payoff from all the payoffs and then dividing all
payoffs by the difference between the max and min payoff, or just dividing by the max payoff if the min
is nonnegative). Note that linear transformations of the payoffs exactly preserve Nash equilibria, so this
normalization would theoretically have no effect on the solutions. For some classes several games generated
had NaN payoff values, and we ignored these games (we report the number of valid games). We can see that
our algorithm ran very quickly for all classes. We note that there was one Random graphical game instance
where our algorithm incorrectly output that the program was infeasible due to numerical instability. Despite
the completeness of the algorithm in theory, there can always be certain specific games constructed that
can lead to numerical issues for optimization solvers that deal with floating-point arithmetic and feasibility
tolerances. However, our algorithm correctly solved all instances with this one exception.
Game class # valid games Avg. time(s) # NotSolved
Bertrand oligopoly 970 0.00104 0
Bidirectional LEG 1000 0.00644 0
Collaboration 1000 0.01186 0
Congestion 1000 0.00660 0
Covariant 1000 0.02772 0
Polymatrix 997 0.01025 0
Random graphical 1000 0.01818 1
Random LEG 1000 0.00620 0
Uniform LEG 1000 0.00579 0
Table 3: Results of new MIQCP algorithm for GAMUT games.
Analogous results for the prior best complete algorithms for these same game classes are in Table 4.
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We can see again that our algorithm typically runs orders of magnitude faster than the others. Note that for
these results the NotSolved% column refers to the percentage of runs where the ǫ of the computed strategies
exceeded 0.001 (this was the criterion from prior work [3]).
Exclusion Method k-Uniform Search
Game class Avg. time(s) NotSolved% Avg. time(s) NotSolved%
Bertrand oligopoly 13.7 0 0.01 0
Bidirectional LEG 159 0 0.013 0
Collaboration 2.8 0 0.0009 0
Congestion 29 0 0.027 0
Covariant 95 0 80 16
Polymatrix 172 0 27.2 7
Random graphical 35000 0 0.05 0
Random LEG 880 0 0.02 0
Uniform LEG 793 0 0.02 0
Table 4: Results of prior complete algorithms for GAMUT games [3].
Table 5 shows results for these same game classes using the best algorithms from the GAMBIT soft-
ware suite [17]. The numbers are the average computation times in seconds and the parentheses show the
percentage of instances that were not solved (code got stuck, empty output, or accuracy not within the given
ǫ = 0.001). All of these methods are incomplete, and in many cases the NotSolved% was quite large.
The runtimes of our algorithm are still about one order of magnitude better than these methods, while also
correctly solving all instances (except for the one exception noted above).
Game class gnm ipa enumpoly simpdiv liap logit
Bertrand oligopoly 0.05 (30) 0.05 (75) 0.04 (50) 0.05 0.24 (99) 0.06
Bidirectional LEG 0.09 (0.3) 0.05 (58) 0.84 (1) 0.06 (0.1) 0.24 (99) 0.06 (0.1)
Collaboration 0.24 (0.1) 0.04 3.3 (50) 0.05 0.34 (99) 0.06 (0.3)
Congestion 0.05 (0.2) 0.05 (85) 0.05 (0.6) 0.05 (0.1) 0.21 (100) 0.05
Covariant 0.13 (3) 0.05 (94) 36 0.67 (2.8) 0.31 (100) 0.05 (1)
Polymatrix 0.06 (1) 0.04 (79) 0.04 (50) 0.07 (0.3) 0.3 (92) 0.05 (0.4)
Random graphical 0.08 (3) 0.04 (96) 6.3 (6) 0.17 (3) 0.31 (99) 0.06 (0.3)
Random LEG 0.05 (1) 0.04 (59) 8.1 (2) 0.05 (0.6) 0.24 (99) 0.06
Uniform LEG 0.07 (0.4) 0.05 (55) 0.04 (17) 0.05 0.23 (99) 0.06
Table 5: Computation times in seconds for GAMBIT algorithms and % of instances not solved [3].
The algorithms are the homotopy method [12] (gnm), its modification using iterated polymatrix ap-
proximation [13] (ipa), an algorithm based on solving a polynomial system of equations (enumpoly), the
simplicial subdivision method [15] (simpdiv), a function minimization approach (liap), and the quantal re-
sponse method [16, 22] (logit).1
Our final comparison is with two recently popular algorithms, counterfactual regret minimization [23]
and fictitious play [5, 20]. These are iterative self-play procedures that have been proven to converge to Nash
equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games, but not for more than two players. However, they can both be run
for more than two players, and have been demonstrated to obtain strong empirical performance in certain
1These experiments were performed using GAMBIT version 15.0 (except 16.0 for simpdiv as it had a bug in 15.0; only simpdiv
changed from 15.0 to 16.0, so only that algorithm was rerun with version 16.0) [3].
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large extensive-form imperfect-information games. For example, an agent that utilized counterfactual regret
minimization (CFR) recently defeated strong humans in 6-player no limit Texas hold ’em [6]. Both CFR
and fictitious play (FP) can be extremely effective at quickly approximating Nash equilibrium strategies,
particularly in large games. However, they can also lead to strategies with extremely high ǫ, even for very
small games. So if the goal is to compute an exact Nash equilibrium in multiplayer games, CFR and FP
are ineffective. Table 6 shows recent results of CFR and FP for games with uniform random payoffs in
[0,1] [10]. We can see that in several cases the average values of ǫ are quite large, and in all cases it exceeds
the previously designated benchmark value of 0.001 [3].
n m # games # algorithm iterations Avg. CFR ǫ Avg. FP ǫ
3 3 100,000 10,000 0.00768 0.00749
3 5 100,000 10,000 0.02312 0.02244
3 10 10,000 10,000 0.05963 0.05574
4 3 100,000 10,000 0.01951 0.01950
4 5 10,000 10,000 0.05121 0.04635
4 10 10,000 10,000 0.08315 0.06661
5 3 10,000 10,000 0.13622 0.03285
5 5 10,000 10,000 0.12286 0.05334
5 10 10,000 1,000 0.07621 0.04325
Table 6: Results of counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play in random games [10].
5 Conclusion
We presented a new complete algorithm for computing Nash equilibrium in multiplayer games based on
a mixed-integer quadratically-constrained feasibility program formulation. Our algorithm outperforms the
previously best complete algorithms by orders of magnitude for all but the largest game class we considered.
Our algorithm even has significantly smaller runtimes than the best prior incomplete methods (which also
frequently fail to compute a solution). We also demonstrated that recently popular iterative algorithms have
significant approximation error and are unsatisfactory for the goal of computing an exact Nash equilibrium.
Our algorithm clearly outperforms all prior approaches on small games, though its scalability may be limited
due to the large number of variables and constraints (exponential in the number of players).
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